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In the four decades since Monroe v. Pape,' the Supreme Court has
crafted a vast body of law on money damages for violations of
constitutional rights. After twenty-five years of following those decisions, I
have come to think that Monroe was wrong. The error lay not in the result,
which was admirable, but in the attribution of that result to a
Reconstruction-era statute applicable indifferently to all rights. Treating the
availability of damages as a transsubstantive exercise in statutory
interpretation obscures important differences among rights and suppresses
clear thinking about remedies. A better strategy would abandon the "one-
size-fits-all" approach and adapt remedies to specific rights. The
availability of money damages would then depend on an assessment of their
role in enforcing particular rights-and especially on the availability of
alternative remedies that make damages more or less needful.
The Monroe Court based its decision on the Civil Rights Act of 1871,
now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983, citing famously inapposite legislative
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1. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
2. The statute provides, in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress ....
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
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history for the proposition that Congress had imposed federal damages
liability for violations of federal rights by state officers, regardless of the
adequacy of state law.3 Whether that was in fact Congress's intent is still
controversial,4 although the weight of opinion supports the Court's view.'
More compelling than the shards of legislative history was the manifest
hardship of making civil rights plaintiffs demonstrate the inadequacy of
state law before seeking federal relief. One need only think of the difficulty
of proving selective prosecution to imagine the burden of having to show a
"custom" or "usage" of indifference to federal rights in order to get
redress in any individual case. Of this very powerful reason for creating a
free-standing federal remedy, the Monroe Court said nothing at all.
Monroe thus began a jurisprudential tradition that still afflicts the law
of § 1983. Questions are asked and answered as if they were of interest only
to antiquarians.6 The history invoked is never conclusive, often irrelevant,7
and sometimes absurd.' Results are attributed to offhand remarks of long-
3. Writing for the Court, Justice Douglas found that the statute had three aims: (1) to override
discriminatory state laws; (2) to provide a federal remedy where procedural obstacles corrupted
the enforcement of state law; and (3) "to provide a federal remedy where the state remedy, though
adequate in theory, was not available in practice." Monroe, 365 U.S. at 173-74. Obviously, these
purposes do not necessarily signal an intent to create a federal remedy where state law is adequate
in both theory and practice.
4. See, e.g., Eric H. Zagrans, "Under Color of' What Law: A Reconstructed Model of
Section 1983 Liability, 71 VA. L. REv. 499, 502 (1985) (arguing that "[a]s a matter of statutory
construction Monroe is flatly wrong").
5. See, e.g., David Achtenberg, A "Milder Measure of Villainy": The Unknown History of 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and the Meaning of "Under Color of" Law, 1999 UTAH L. REv. 1, 5 (seeking to
dispel the "remarkably persistent myth that the Forty-second Congress never intended the
provision to cover constitutional wrongs unless those wrongs were actually authorized by state
law"); Steven L. Winter, The Meaning of "Under Color of' Law, 91 MICH. L. REV. 323, 325
(1992) (condemning the "Frankfurter-Zagrans misinterpretation of section 1983" as "not only
wrong, but wildly ahistorical").
6. For an example of this approach, see Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983), in which the
Court engaged in an extensive review of nineteenth-century sources to support its conclusion that
punitive damages should be available for "callous indifference" to federal rights. Id. at 56. Three
Justices performed a similar historical exegesis to support a requirement of "bad faith or improper
motive on the part of the defendant" before damages could be awarded. Id. (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). Only Justice O'Connor thought that the Court should consult "the policies underlying
§ 1983 to determine which rule [is] best." Id. at 93 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
7. Monroe itself is an example. More flamboyant is Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984), in
which the Court recounted the techniques through which the King's Bench asserted primacy
among English courts as a basis for concluding that American judges were not absolutely immune
from injunctive relief. Id. at 529-36. The Court conceded that "[t]he relationship between the
King's Bench and its collateral and inferior courts is not precisely paralleled in our system by the
relationship between the state and federal courts," id. at 535, but insisted that the history of this
question, as it arose in a different country in a different era and under a different legal system, was
nonetheless "highly relevant," id. at 536.
8. See, for example, Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980), in which the Court
considered whether municipalities and other local governments would have the same qualified
immunity from damages liability available to all other "persons" sued under § 1983. The Court
found that, for most purposes, municipalities enjoyed absolute, not qualified, immunity in the
nineteenth century and inferred that they therefore should have no immunity at all in the
twentieth. Id. at 638-50.
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dead legislators who could not have foreseen the issues at hand or the
constitutional landscape in which they arise. One can only sympathize with
Justices who feel obliged to divine what members of the Forty-second
Congress would have thought, had they thought, of something that never
crossed their minds. It's rather like asking, "If I had a sister, would she like
cheese?" 9
Worse, the relentless historicity of § 1983 decisions diverts attention
from the merits. Important issues are resolved without discussion of any
reason why we should care. In Monroe, for example, the Court expressly
disavowed "policy considerations" in ruling that municipalities could not
be sued under § 1983." In Monell v. Department of Social Services, the
Court again ignored policy concerns in reaching precisely the opposite
conclusion." One may admire the Court's willingness to admit error, but
surely, somewhere along the way, the Justices should have considered
whether municipal liability is a good idea. Either they had no view on that
question, or they felt constrained by the methodology of statutory
interpretation not to reveal their reasoning.
Fortunately, the preoccupation with history seems to be receding. As
precedents accumulate and the field matures, the Court increasingly turns to
its own prior utterances as the starting point for analysis. This approach
allows more room for consideration of policy and practicality. Recent
opinions say less about the views of Representatives Blair and
Shellabarger 2 and more about the advantages and disadvantages of
competing positions. 3 Of course, the results remain controversial, but the
shift toward candid discussion of the concerns that might move a rational
Justice (or student or professor) to favor one outcome over another is surely
to be welcomed.4
9. I have forgotten from whom I stole this remark.
10. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 191 ("We do not reach those policy considerations.").
11. 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (discussing exclusively legislative intent and the reasons for
departing from stare decisis).
12. Representative Blair's detailed criticism of the Sherman amendment figured largely in the
Court's reconsideration of municipal liability in Monell, 436 U.S. at 673-75. Representative
Shellabarger sponsored H.R. 320, which eventually became § 1983. His remarks are cited in
Monroe, 365 U.S. at 185, 228 & n.41, 232 n.48, and in Monell, 436 U.S. at 669-73, 683-84.
13. Early examples are the cases in which the Court has eliminated the "subjective branch"
of qualified immunity in an effort to streamline § 1983 litigation and avoid trial of insubstantial
claims. E.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 813-18 (1982) (extensively analyzing the
"balance between the evils inevitable in any available alternative" scheme of qualified
immunity).
14. For trenchant criticism of the traditional approach, see Jack M. Beermann, A Critical
Approach to Section 1983 with Special Attention to Sources of Law, 42 STAN. L. REV. 51 (1989).
which criticizes the Court's "manipulation" of legislative history and other sources as
"transparent"; Richard A. Matasar, Personal Immunities Under Section 1983: The Limits of the
Court's Historical Analysis, 40 ARK. L. REv. 741 (198-7), which criticizes the Court's reliance on
history in official immunity cases; and Michael Wells, The Past and the Future of Constitutional
Torts: From Statutory Interpretation to Common Law Rules, 19 CONN. L. REV. 53, 54 (1986),
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Unfortunately, another legacy of Monroe remains firmly entrenched.
By anchoring constitutional tort actions in the brief generalities of § 1983,
the Monroe Court severed the law of money damages from the rights they
enforce. The statute itself creates no rights. It provides a cause of action for
redressing deprivation of "rights, privileges, or immunities" created
elsewhere. There is no textual opportunity to differentiate among
constitutional violations or to calibrate specific remedies. So far as appears,
all remedies are available for all rights on the same terms. Even though we
know that rights and remedies are connected, interactive, and mutually
dependent and defining, 5 constitutional tort law pretends that it is not so.
Instead, the Monroe approach is comprehensive and categorical. It gives the
same remedial answer to every constitutional question.
By imprisoning remedial choice in the methodology of statutory
historicism, the Supreme Court has locked out concerns that should matter.
In particular, current doctrine awards or withholds money damages without
regard to alternative remedies. Instead, damages should be integrated with
other means of redress in remedial strategies for particular rights. In other
words, we should disaggregate constitutional tort law to allow a better fit
between damages remedy and constitutional right.
The suggestion that money damages should vary with the underlying
claim presupposes that they not be available in every case. If optimal
enforcement were maximum enforcement, every constitutional violation
would trigger money damages, and there would be no case for mediating
doctrine. The argument for differentiating remedial strategies across rights
assumes that sometimes less is better. Put differently, the argument assumes
that there is, and sometimes should be, a gap between constitutional rights
and damages remedies.'
6
which urges the Court to "discard legislative intent as an analytic tool for adjudicating
constitutional tort claims."
15. See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM.
L. REV. 857 (1999) (advancing a typology of right-remedy interaction).
16. The normative aspect of this proposition is opposed by the weight of academic opinion,
which favors strict liability for all constitutional violations. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Of
Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1490-91 (1987) (endorsing the "remedial
imperative" of governmental liability); Mark R. Brown, Correlating Municipal Liability and
Official Immunity Under Section 1983, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 625, 631 (contending that
governmental liability and officer immunity should be correlated to eliminate any gap between
right and remedy); Mark R. Brown, The Demise of Constitutional Prospectivity: New Life for
Owen?, 79 IoWA L. REV. 273, 311-12 (1994) [hereinafter Brown, The Demise of Constitutional
Prospectivity] (condemning immunity from award of damages even for violations of newly
declared constitutional rights); Harold S. Lewis, Jr. & Theodore Y. Blumoff, Reshaping Section
1983's Asymmetry, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 755, 756 (1992) (endorsing strict governmental liability
for constitutional violations); Sheldon Nahmod, Constitutional Damages and Corrective Justice:
A Different View, 76 VA. L. REV. 997, 1019 (1990) (endorsing compensatory damages for all
foreseeable harms resulting from constitutional violations); Christina B. Whitman, Government
Responsibility for Constitutional Torts, 85 MICH. L. REV. 225, 229-30 (1986) (endorsing strict
governmental liability for constitutional violations).
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Under current law, that gap not only exists, but is very large. It results
from a requirement of fault, beyond the mere fact of unconstitutionality, on
the part of officer defendants sued under § 1983."7 The liability standard is
negligence with respect to illegality. Its doctrinal home is qualified
immunity, which bars the award of damages for injuries resulting from
unconstitutional acts that "a reasonable officer could have believed. . . to
be lawful." 18 As administered, qualified immunity precludes damages for a
substantial range of constitutional violations, especially where the
underlying standards are murky or unclear. Occasionally, localities can be
sued directly under § 1983 and held liable without proof of fault, but the
circumstances are very limited. 9 In the great bulk of cases, civil rights
plaintiffs must sue government officers, all of whom can claim at least
qualified immunity from liability for money damages. 0 Qualified immunity
is the doctrinal wedge that separates damages from other remedies.
This Essay argues that the law of qualified immunity should be refined
and rethought. It not only should differentiate damages from other
remedies, but also should differentiate damages among rights. Neither the
rationales for, nor the arguments against, qualified immunity apply equally
to all constitutional violations. Costs and benefits are distributed unevenly.
Much depends on the effectiveness of money damages in redressing
particular violations and on the efficacy and availability of other remedies.
Current law suppresses such concerns. A better approach would
disaggregate constitutional torts and adapt remedial strategies to specific
wrongs.
This Essay proceeds from the descriptive to the normative. Part I begins
with a review of the rationales for qualified immunity. There are at least
two distinct rationales for limiting money damages for constitutional
violations, and neither applies in all contexts. Analyzing the functions of
qualified immunity doctrine under current law reveals significant variation
in the role and utility of money damages in different circumstances.
Part II is explicitly normative. It presses the argument that differences
among constitutional violations should be acknowledged and exploited in
the law on money damages. In some contexts, damages will be an essential
mechanism of enforcement; in others, damages can be treated as a backup
remedy aimed at special situations. The analysis depends crucially on the
17. John C. Jeffries, Jr., In Praise of the Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983, 84 VA. L.
REv. 47, 54-59 (1998) (documenting the centrality of fault in § 1983 litigation).
18. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987).
19. Jeffries, supra note 17, at 58-59 (detailing doctrinal restrictions on strict liability of local
governments).
20. On the absolute immunity of officers performing legislative, judicial, and certain
prosecutorial functions, as well as the likely ways around that defense by suing another defendant,
see id. at 57.
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availability of other remedies. Part II sketches the kind of integrated right-
remedy analysis toward which courts should move.
Part III is a brief conclusion. It calls for reconceptualizing and
reorganizing the law of § 1983.
I. THE THREE FACES OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
The Supreme Court espouses a unified-field theory of qualified
immunity. In Justice Brennan's words, the law of qualified immunity
reflects a balance struck "across the board," rather than with reference to
particular claims." In Anderson v. Creighton, the Court endorsed that
remark, adding that "we have been unwilling to complicate qualified
immunity analysis by making the scope or extent of immunity turn on the
precise nature of various officials' duties or the precise character of the
particular rights alleged to have been violated."22 Doctrinally, therefore,
qualified immunity applies comprehensively to all damages actions brought
against state and local officers under § 1983, as well as to analogous actions
against federal officers under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
Federal Bureau of Narcotics.23 In all such cases, the defendant is immune
from award of money damages "if a reasonable officer could have
believed" in the legality of the act that caused the plaintiff's injury.
24
Of course, practical lawyers seeking practical guidance do not stop with
generalities. They look for precedents similar to the case at hand. The
search for recurring factual patterns has particularized to some extent the
law of qualified immunity, as decisions are collected about police officers,
hospital administrators, school officials, and so forth.
25 Nevertheless,
21. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 821 (1982) (Brennan, J., concurring).
22. 483 U.S. at 643; see also Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 605 n.2 (1998)
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting the statement from Creighton).
23. 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971) (authorizing damages actions against federal officers for
violation of the Fourth Amendment). The immunities available to federal officers under Bivens
are the same as those available to state and local officers under § 1983, and the two lines of cases
are cited interchangeably. E.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978) (concluding that it
would be "untenable to draw a distinction for purposes of immunity law between suits brought
against state officials under § 1983 and suits brought directly under the Constitution against
federal officials").
24. Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228 (1991) (per curiam) (holding that Secret Service
agents are entitled to qualified immunity for unconstitutional arrest "if a reasonable officer could
have believed" that the arrest was lawful); Creighton, 483 U.S. at 641 (same standard).
25. E.g., 2 SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIvIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION: THE
LAW OF SECTION 1983, at §§ 8.28-.99 (4th ed. 1999) (analyzing separately the qualified immunity
of school officials, mental-hospital officials, prison employees, law enforcement officers, and
state and local government executives); lB MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ & JOHN E. KIRKLIN, SECTION
1983 LITIGATION: CLAIMS AND DEFENSES § 9.14 (3d ed. 1997) (cataloguing qualified immunity
cases for law enforcement officers, prison officials, school officials, mental-hospital
administrators, and other state and local officials).
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doctrinally and at some meaningful level of application, qualified immunity
remains constant for all claims.
Functionally, however, qualified immunity is surprisingly complex.
There are at least two rationales for limiting money damages for
constitutional violations, and qualified immunity sometimes serves one
purpose and sometimes another. In a great many cases, it plays no part at
all. These variations do not arise from the law of qualified immunity but
from the substantive claims to which that issue applies. They arise, in short,
from variations among rights. Differences in the role of qualified immunity
reflect differences in the role of money damages in redressing constitutional
violations. Three examples will illustrate possible interactions between
qualified immunity and specific constitutional violations.
A. Search and Seizure
It is no accident that illegal search and seizure is so often invoked to
make the case for qualified immunity. As conventionally understood, that
case rests on overdeterrence-the risk that strict liability for constitutional
violations would unacceptably inhibit the legitimate business of
government.26  The overdeterrence rationale purports to apply to
constitutional torts generally but in fact makes sense (if at all) only in some
contexts. Nowhere is the fear of overdeterrence more plausible than in
claims of illegal search and seizure.
Of course, awarding money damages for constitutional violations is
intended to deter. That is the point.27 Maximum deterrence would be
achieved not by the fault-based regime of qualified immunity but by
holding governments strictly liable for all injuries caused by
26. PErER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL WRONGS
64-77 (1983): Jeffries, supra note 17, at 70-71, 73-74.
27. On compensation as a noninstrumental concern, see John C. Jeffries, Jr., Compensation
for Constitutional Torts: Reflections on the Significance of Fault, 88 MICH. L. REv. 82, 99-101
(1989), which argues that the noninstrumental rationale of corrective justice does not require strict
damages liability for constitutional violations. This argument has been criticized on its own terms,
but more strongly on the ground that it ignores the primacy of instrumental concerns in the law of
§ 1983. E.g., Brown, The Demise of Constitutional Prospectivity, supra note 16, at 298 (arguing
that qualified immunity is essentially instrumental, as its purpose is not to deny redress for
wrongdoing but to promote independent decisionmaking by officials); Harold S. Lewis, Jr. &
Theodore Y. Blumoff, Reshaping Section 1983's Asymmetry, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 755, 836-37
(1992) (disputing the assumption "that we can meaningfully discuss noninstrumental or
nondeterrent rationales for § 1983's remedial scheme without considering deterrence"); Nahmod,
supra note 16, at 1004 (arguing that qualified immunity is "essentially instrumental in nature").
Contra Barbara E. Armacost, Qualified Immunity: Ignorance Excused, 51 VAND. L. REV. 583,
666-720 (1998) (justifying qualified immunity on the ground that civil damages liability has a
,moral blaming function" analogous to criminal prosecution and is therefore appropriate when
the officer had "fair notice" of illegality).
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unconstitutional behavior. 21 Strict liability would force government to
internalize the costs of constitutional violations, including those not avoided
by cost-justified precautions in hiring, training, supervision, and the like.
Requiring government to bear the full costs of such actions would not only
induce it to take such precautions, it would also depress activity levels for
conduct that is likely to involve constitutional error despite reasonable
care. 9 In the private sector, this effect is often welcomed. Forcing private
actors to internalize all accident costs, including those not prevented by
reasonable precautions, may lead to socially desirable reductions in activity
levels.3" That is why the liability rule for ordinary torts often leans toward
strict liability, sometimes by adopting that standard outright, as in cases of
ultrahazardous activity,31 and sometimes by administering the negligence
standard in ways that push it in that direction.32 The case for qualified
immunity in constitutional tort actions rests on the claim that the
government is somehow different, that requiring the government to bear the
costs of all constitutional violations would reduce legitimate governmental
activities to suboptimal levels.
This claim was brilliantly advanced by Peter Schuck.33 Focusing on the
discretionary choices of "street-level" officials, Schuck noted that police
officers, prison guards, welfare administrators, school superintendents, and
the like deliver basic government services on terms that are often
nonconsensual and sometimes coercive. Their actions produce conflict and
28. Here, as elsewhere, I use "strict liability" to refer to the liability rule that would obtain if
the fault requirement of qualified immunity were eliminated from § 1983. In some cases, the
underlying constitutional violation would require a reprehensible state of mind quite apart from
the law of § 1983. In those cases, eliminating the defense of qualified immunity would render
liability "strict" only in a limited sense. A better formulation might be that eliminating qualified
immunity would render damages liability potentially strict, depending on the content of the
underlying right. Jeffries, supra note 17, at 57 (explaining this point).
29. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM. THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 164-65 (1997)
(explaining the effect of strict liability on activity levels); Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus
Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 6-7 (1980) (stating that, in general, activity levels will be lower
under strict liability than under a fault-based regime).
30. ABRAHAM, supra note 29, at 164-65.
31. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1977) (discussing strict liability for
"abnormally dangerous activity"); see also id. § 520(f) (stating that among the factors to be
considered in determining whether an activity is "abnormally dangerous" under section 519 is
whether "its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous attributes").
32. I have in mind here such practices as the pronounced disinclination of many courts to
enter summary judgment for defendants in negligence cases, thus opening the door for juries to
impose liability with or without fault. For example, it has been recognized for decades that liberal
use of res ipsa loquitur to prove negligence leans toward strict liability. E.g., Escola v. Coca Cola
Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 441 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring) (" In leaving it to the jury to
decide whether the inference [of negligence] has been dispelled, regardless of the evidence against
it, the negligence rule approaches the rule of strict liability."); ABRAHAM, supra note 29, at 97
(describing res ipsa loquitur as "a way of obtaining under-the-table strict liability").
33. SCHUCK, supra note 26, at 59-81. For a similar view, see, for example, Richard A.
Posner, Excessive Sanctions for Governmental Misconduct in Criminal Cases, 57 WASH. L. REV.
635, 638-40 (1982), which argues that both exclusion of evidence and officer liability for Fourth
Amendment violations risk overdeterrence of legitimate law enforcement activity.
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harm. While negative outcomes can readily be translated into adverse legal
claims, the benefits of good performance are hard to capture. These skewed
incentives may bias discretionary choices. Rather than attempting to
maximize the net benefits of their actions, street-level officials may seek
merely to minimize their costs. The result is a bias toward inaction,
defensiveness, and bureaucratic self-protection.
This bias is reinforced by an asymmetry in legal remedies. Those
injured by affirmative conduct have no trouble stating a claim for relief.
The defendant is known, and causation is clear. By contrast, those harmed
by a failure to act often have difficulty identifying the right defendant and
linking their injuries to specific inaction.3 Even when the defendant is
known and causation clear, government officers exercising discretionary
authority cannot be held liable for failure to act absent a legally enforceable
duty to act.35 Consequently, an officer's exposure to liability for wrongful
acts is vastly greater than his or her exposure to liability for wrongful
inaction, even though erroneous action and erroneous inaction may be
equally costly. This asymmetry in the availability of redress reinforces the
incentives for government officers to protect themselves by doing less.
One may find these arguments persuasive, as the courts evidently do,
but the analysis is incomplete. The diagnosis of skewed incentives ignores
the fact that governments routinely defend their officers against
constitutional tort claims and indemnify them for adverse judgments.36 Of
course, in cases of flagrant misconduct (of the sort that might trigger
criminal prosecution), a government might cut its employee loose, but it is
hard to imagine a case of simple search and seizure (unaccompanied by
assault or other grievous harm) provoking that reaction. Thus, although
government officers cannot capture the social benefits of their actions,
neither do they pay the full costs. Their incentives may be reduced, but they
are not necessarily skewed.
Despite this qualification, there are at least three reasons to worry about
overdeterrence. The first is government employment law. Under civil
34. See SCHUCK, supra note 26, at 80 (noting that persons injured by affirmative wrongdoing
are far more likely to seek redress than the "invisible victims of official self-protection"); Jerry L.
Mashaw, Civil Liability of Government Officers: Property Rights and Official Accountability, 42
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 8, 29 (1978) (discussing the "problematic" nature of causes of action
for a law enforcement officer's failure to act).
35. For a famous example, see DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social
Services, 489 U.S. 189, 196-97, 202 (1989), which concludes that a state's failure to protect
a victim of child abuse did not violate due process.
36. Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, The Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation, 72
CORNELL L. REV. 641, 686 (1987) (finding no cases in which "an individual official had borne
the cost of an adverse constitutional tort judgment"); Jeffries, supra note 17, at 49-50 (asserting
that, "[s]o far as can be assessed," governments defend their officers against constitutional tort
claims and indemnify them for adverse judgments); Lant B. Davis et al., Project, Suing the Police
in Federal Court, 88 YALE L.J. 781, 810-12 (1979) (reporting government defense and
indemnification of police officers in Connecticut).
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service rules, most government workers cannot be fired simply for not
doing a good job. Generally, government workers face discharge only for
demonstrably bad performance-provable misconduct or neglect that
justifies civil service termination. 7 Under this regime, rational government
employees might well be preoccupied with avoiding egregious mistakes.
Second, this incentive-based cautionary bias may be reinforced by
employee self-selection. Risktakers may be drawn to the private sector,
where they are more likely to be rewarded, while risk-avoiders seek out
government work for job security. 38 Finally, there is a political asymmetry
between on-budget costs, which mean higher taxes, and off-budget costs,
which (at least in the first instance) fall elsewhere.39 Government action
may trigger civil liability, which must be accounted for in the department's
budget. Government inaction does not carry the same risk. The error costs
of not searching a criminal suspect or not suspending a disruptive student
may be equal to the error costs of taking such actions, but the burdens are
borne by the suspect's subsequent victims or by the student's affected
classmates. Such costs may eventually be brought to bear on government
officers through the political process, but the mechanisms for bringing them
to bear are diffuse, indirect, and long-term. It therefore seems plausible that
government managers weigh on-budget costs more than off-budget costs
and that this asymmetry reinforces the bias toward caution and inaction.'
37. For the procedural protections afforded federal employees, see 5 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1105
(1994), which provides merit selection and job security. See generally Richard A. Merrill,
Procedures for Adverse Actions Against Federal Employees, 59 VA. L. REV. 196, 211-31 (1973)
(describing the history of the federal civil service). For all government workers, including those
employed by states and localities, the tradition of civil service is undergirded and reinforced by
the requirements of procedural due process. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470
U.S. 532, 539 (1985) (holding that public employees who can be discharged only "for cause"
under civil service regulations have property rights in their jobs).
38. Don Bellante & Albert N. Link, Are Public Sector Workers More Risk Averse Than
Private Sector Workers?, 34 INDus. & LAB. REL. REV. 408, 411-12 (1981) (reporting empirical
results consistent with economic reasoning suggesting that risk-averse workers will be more likely
to seek government work); see also SCHCJcK, supra note 26, at 57 (opining that civil service
employees "probably tend to be more risk-averse with respect to litigation and liability than
individuals generally").
39. See Alison L. Patton, Note, The Endless Cycle of Abuse: Why 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Is
Ineffective in Deterring Police Brutality, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 753, 800-01 (1993) (arguing that the
increased tax burdens resulting from civil liability generate media attention and public concern);
cf. Richard B. Stewart, Federalism and Rights, 19 GA. L. REV. 917, 961 (1985) (noting the
"prioritizing discipline" that the budget process imposes on direct expenditures). The tendency to
undervalue off-budget costs is essentially the problem of unfunded mandates. Elizabeth Garrett,
Enhancing the Political Safeguards of Federalism? The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995,
45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1113, 1114-17 (1997). On the political penalties for raising taxes, see Jeffries,
supra note 17, at 77 n.107.
40. This observation seems more than plausible to me, but recent literature has shown the
need for caution, at least, in tracing the incentive effects of civil liability on government actors.
Daryl Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional
Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 345, 347-48 (2000) (suggesting that "government cannot be expected
to respond to forced financial outflows in any socially desirable, or even predictable way").
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I have made these arguments in detail elsewhere,4 but they remain
fundamentally speculative. Hard data are not available, nor are they likely
to become so. The best I can say is that the overdeterrence rationale for
qualified immunity seems sometimes sound to me. More to the point, it
seems sound to the Supreme Court. Recent decisions support a robust
conception of qualified immunity, one that protects against damages
liability whenever a (barely) reasonable officer could have believed his or
her actions to be lawful.42 Current doctrine rests squarely on the
overdeterrence rationale. Although in my opinion the Justices have not
given sufficient attention to the implications of employer defense and
indemnification, at least they have explained why they think qualified
immunity is a good idea, and their reason is overdeterrence. 43
Even if the validity of this concern cannot be proved, this much seems
certain: If there is any context in which the threat of strict damages liability
for constitutional violations would seriously inhibit the legitimate activities
of government, search and seizure is it. Note how closely the circumstances
of investigative searches support the overdeterrence rationale. Searches are
conducted by street-level officers, only occasionally on orders from senior
managers. The officers typically have discretion not to act. The decision
whether to act is made on the spot, often based on sketchy information
subject to conflicting interpretations. Decisions are made retail; that action
is or is not justified in one situation says almost nothing about another.
Most important, the standards for determining the legality of search and
seizure are notoriously vague. Questions about what constitutes
,"reasonable suspicion" or "probable cause" are irreducibly judgmental and
therefore ultimately discretionary. If every error automatically triggered
penalties, police officers-and those who employ them-would be
expected to steer clear of the danger zone by not searching in a doubtful
case."4
41. Jeffries, supra note 17, at 75-77.
42. See, e.g., Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999) (holding officers immune from liability
for inviting media representatives to accompany them in an arrest in the home, despite the
unanimous conclusion of all federal judges who have considered the issue that the media "ride-
alongs" violate the Fourth Amendment).
43. E.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982) (discussing "the danger that fear of
being sued will 'dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible [public
officials], in the unflinching discharge of their duties' (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579,
581 (2d Cir. 1949))); see also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 645-46 (1987) (following
Harlow in expansively interpreting qualified immunity).
44. For another formulation of this point, see Jeffries, supra note 17, at 73-74. I explain:
To put this point into a practical context, one need only imagine a supervisor
instructing police officers (as all police are instructed these days) on the law of the
Fourth Amendment. Under the regime of qualified immunity, the instructor would
explain the rules of search and seizure and enjoin adherence to them, but would also tell
the officers that reasonable mistakes would not be held against them. Now imagine the
same situation under a regime of strict liability. The supervisor would instruct her
charges not only to be careful about probable cause but also, and more importantly, not
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Under current'law, this problem does not exist. On the contrary,
prevailing interpretations of qualified immunity insulate officers (and the
governments that employ them) from damages liability for all but the most
flagrantly abusive searches. Under current doctrine, search-and-seizure
issues arise not in claims for compensation but on motions to suppress
evidence. In this setting, police officers may feel that they have little at
stake. Moreover, the fact that there is something to suppress means that the
search uncovered incriminating evidence. Typically, the complainant is
guilty of a nontrivial crime. Faced with a succession of guilty defendants
objecting to successful searches, judges might well give officers the benefit
of the doubt."a Under current law, therefore, overdeterrence is not a
problem. If, however, qualified immunity were eliminated, the prospect of
officer liability for unlawful search and seizure might induce debilitating
caution.
For present purposes, the important point is to recognize that the
conditions that make overdeterrence a realistic fear in the realm of search
and seizure do not necessarily obtain elsewhere. The search-and-seizure
context is distinguished by the abstractness of the controlling legal
standards, the necessity of applying those standards case by case, and the
resulting devolution of discretion to street-level officials. Some government
actions have similar characteristics, but others do not. The concern for
overdeterrence is therefore neither uniform nor comprehensive, but on the
contrary quite local. For illegal search and seizure, qualified immunity may
well be justified by the risk that strict liability would unacceptably inhibit
legitimate law enforcement. In other contexts, qualified immunity serves
different purposes and implicates different concerns.
B. Freedom of Speech
One feature of the law of search and seizure not mentioned so far is its
stability. Over the past generation, the Supreme Court has reduced
protection for automobiles' and nibbled at exclusion,47 but the basic rules
to search in any doubtful case. Under strict liability, the supervisor would require a kind
of super-probable cause, steering well clear of the constitutional standard in order to
avoid liability for inevitable mistakes. In consequence, there would be fewer searches.
Id. (footnote omitted).
45. See Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, 1999 U.
ILL. L. REv. 363, 403-04. Slobogin examines the effect of "representativeness" and
"availability" on search-and-seizure decisions. "Representativeness" means that judges are likely
to associate Fourth Amendment interests with the guilty defendants who come before them in
suppression hearings. "Availability" means that judges will rely overmuch on their memory of
suppression hearings, all of which (one assumes) involved searches that were successful in
uncovering incriminating evidence.
46. See Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938 (1996) (rejecting a requirement of "exigency"
apart from the existence of probable cause and a mobile vehicle); California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S.
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have remained largely unchanged.4" Other areas of constitutional law have
seen more growth. In these areas, qualified immunity's chief function is to
facilitate change.4 ' By denying damages to persons injured by discarded
past practices, qualified immunity reduces the cost of innovation. It enables
courts to adopt new rules without requiring payment to those who did not
benefit from the new rule in the past. Without that limitation, the costs of
compensation might well prove paralyzing. Requiring full remediation for
past failure to comply with newly announced rules would stifle
constitutional innovation and risk rigidity and ossification in constitutional
law.
In essence, qualified immunity is a variant of nonretroactivity. Unlike
the 1960s doctrine of that name,50 however, qualified immunity applies not
only to the occasional dramatic break from prior law, such as Miranda,"1
but also (and more importantly) to the small-scale, evolutionary growth and
clarification that are the lifeblood of the law. Qualified immunity thus
operates on a vastly broader scale than the old nonretroactivity doctrine but
is shallower in effect. It bars only money damages. Other remedies remain
in place to enforce new rights. Nevertheless, qualified immunity and
nonretroactivity are functional cousins: Both facilitate reform by reducing
the cost of innovation. Without a limit on costs, there would be less
reform.
52
565 (1991) (finding that police authority to engage in a warrantless search based on probable
cause extends to closed containers within vehicles); New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106 (1986)
(stating that probable cause is not necessary to ascertain a vehicle identification number after a
valid traffic stop); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) (holding that searches justified
under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement can be as thorough as searches
authorized by warrants).
47. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (holding that illegally seized
evidence is admissible if police had a good faith belief in the validity of a warrant subsequently
found to be not supported by probable cause); United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980)
(holding that illegally seized evidence is allowed for purposes of impeachment of testimony
relating to the crime charged); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976) (holding that exclusion
of illegally seized evidence is not required at an IRS hearing).
48. The two expansions in Fourth Amendment rights in the last thirty years were Payton v.
New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), which required warrants for arrests in the home, thereby limiting
searches incident to such arrests, and Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), which limited the
use of deadly force.
49. This discussion recapitulates John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in
Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87,95-105 (1999).
50. The standard citation is Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965), which held that the
exclusionary rule of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), did not apply retroactively to cases that
had become final before that decision.
51. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), was held nonretroactive in Johnson v. New
Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
52. See, e.g., Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 676-77 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (recognizing that the nonretroactivity doctrine facilitated "long
overdue reforms, which otherwise could not be practicably effected" (quoting Jenkins v.
Delaware, 395 U.S. 213, 218 (1969))).
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When I first broached this argument, some readers questioned the
endorsement of constitutional innovation. That reaction reflects the rhetoric
of constitutional law, which looks unswervingly to the past. Supreme Court
opinions emphasize prior decisions, traditional understandings, and original
intent. Far from celebrating change, they disguise it.53 Although the
rhetorical commitment to the past obscures and devalues constitutional
change, a moment's reflection reveals that it is continuing, inevitable,
and-in my view-ultimately desirable. That is not to say that I celebrate
change for its own sake. Constitutional innovations are sometimes
mistaken, often unnecessary, and always destabilizing. Nevertheless, the
capacity of constitutional law to respond to new circumstances is an
enormous strength. Unless the world in which we live is going to stop
changing, constitutional law must change also. Indeed, given the
technological, economic, social, and political transformations since the
nation's founding, it is hard to imagine that the original Constitution could
have survived in recognizable form had it lacked the capacity for internal
growth. 4 That the Constitution has proved to have that capacity, despite its
aura of permanence and immutability, depends crucially on the limitation of
damages liability for newly disapproved past practice.
Examples of the potential antagonism between retrospective damages
and future rights are not hard to find. The conflict surfaces not only in the
occasional paradigm-shifting pronouncement 5 but also in the small-scale
innovations that show up annually in casebook supplements. Virtually all
such publications have something new to report about freedom of speech,
which for at least five decades has been the premier growth industry in
constitutional law.
53. Jeffries, supra note 49, at 95-96 (describing various techniques for "claiming continuity
while embracing innovation").
54. I have observed:
[I]t is hard to imagine what our Constitution would be if original understandings had
been faithfully maintained without "translation" to changed circumstances. Most
likely, we would have had a succession of increasingly prolix organic documents, as
heavily amended prior versions became too cumbersome or outdated. Ironically, the
reason that we still have some version of the original Constitution and that we can refer
(more or less meaningfully) to the intent of the Framers is the document's capacity for
internal growth.
Id. at 97 (footnote omitted).
55. For an extended speculation on the effect that retrospective damages liability would have
had on the law of school desegregation, see id. at 101-03. The analysis focuses on Brown v. Board
of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and especially on Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S.
430 (1968). Green transformed Brown's ruling that government stop requiring segregation into an
affirmative command that government act to eliminate segregation. The essay asks "what the
Court would have done if announcing an 'affirmative duty' to eliminate racially identifiable
schools had meant huge damages judgments against Southern school districts" and concludes that
"it seems entirely plausible that Green might have come out differently under a regime of strict
liability in money damages." Jeffries, supra note 49, at 103.
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Consider, for example, the line of cases beginning with Elrod v.
Burns.16 Before that decision, successful Republican candidates for sheriff
fired every Democratic deputy in sight, and Democrats did the same thing
in reverse." Political patronage of this sort had been widespread at least
since the days of Andrew Jackson, with antecedents running back to the
nation's founding.58 In Elrod, five Justices decided to replace that system
with a form of civil service more consistent with the values of the First
Amendment. The prevalence of statutory civil service schemes may have
encouraged this step, 9 as did the expansion of public sector employment.'
Probably more important was the ideological momentum of the Court's
own rulings expanding First Amendment freedoms in other contexts.61 In
any event, Elrod was not a sport. Four years later, the Justices extended
its reasoning to public defenders, thereby narrowing the class of
"policymaking" or "confidential" employees who could be hired and fired
based on politics. 62 More recently, the Court ruled (five to four) that Elrod
protected government workers not only against politically motivated
dismissal, but also against political favoritism in a variety of other
employment decisions, including hiring, promotion, and transfer.63 Finally,
in 1996, the Justices concluded that the same principles should apply to
independent contractors, who are now protected against political favoritism
that benefits their competitors.'
None of these decisions was dictated by precedent. Each required some
degree of innovation, ranging from the sharp left turn in Elrod itself to the
more or less logical extension of Elrod's reasoning in subsequent cases. In
taking these steps, the Justices did not have to worry about imposing
damages liability for past patronage. If sued for damages, state and local
employers would have successfully invoked qualified immunity for acts
reasonably believed to have been lawful when done. Without that
protection, the situation would have been radically different. Many
56. 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
57. Id. at 351 ("It has been the practice of the Sheriff of Cook County, when he assumes
office from a Sheriff of a different political party, to replace non-civil-service employees of the
Sheriffs Office with members of his own party when the existing employees lack or fail to obtain
requisite support from, or fail to affiliate with, that party." ).
58. See generally DAVID H. ROSENBLOOM, FEDERAL SERVICE AND THE CONSTITUTION 47-
55 (1971) (examining the historical development of the "spoils system").
59. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 353-54 (noting the decline in patronage employment in the wake of the
Pendleton Act of 1883).
60. Id. at 356 (noting that as government employment rises, patronage increases the
incumbent party's "power to starve political opposition by commanding partisan support,
financial and otherwise").
61. E.g., id. at 356-60 (discussing the inconsistency of political patronage with modem free
speech decisions).
62. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980).
63. Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62 (1990).
64. O'Hare Truck Serv. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712 (1996).
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thousands of deputy sheriffs, court bailiffs, jail guards, process servers, and
other patronage employees would have been entitled to money damages for
discharge or other employment action based on political affiliation or
loyalty. Would that prospect have altered the constitutional decision?
Would the Justices have been concerned, as they have been elsewhere,
about the impact of civil liability on municipal taxation and services?65
Would they have recoiled at the unfairness of imposing liability on
defendants who did what had always been done and who had no reason to
do otherwise? Would they have hesitated to reward plaintiffs who got their
positions through the same political patronage that they now decried?6 It is,
of course, impossible to say with certainty what would have happened in a
state of affairs that did not exist, but it seems clear that the prospect of
damages liability for past practice would have cut against expanding First
Amendment rights. Indeed, it is plausible to think that the concern would
have proved decisive.
Much the same can be said of commercial speech. In Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,67 the
Supreme Court ruled that commercial advertising was not so removed from
First Amendment values as to lack all constitutional protection. For a time
it appeared that the "commonsense differences ' 68 between commercial
advertising and political debate meant that the former could be regulated
whenever the government had a good reason, 69 but recent decisions have
pushed commercial advertising closer to the highly protective rules for
other content-based restrictions on speech. 70 The cases in this line are more
numerous than those concerning political patronage and more muddled. At
any given point, government officers could reasonably have thought lawful
restrictions that the courts later found unconstitutional. Commercial speech
plaintiffs therefore won injunctions, declaratory judgments, perhaps
65. E.g., City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 267 (1981) (citing the
prospect of increased taxes or reduction of services as a reason for disallowing punitive damages
against municipalities).
66. Cf. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 377 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("The named respondents, several
discharged employees and another employee threatened with discharge, are all Republicans who
concededly were hired by Elrod's predecessor because of their political affiliations.").
67. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
68. Id. at 771 n.24 (noting "commonsense differences between speech that does 'no more
than propose a commercial transaction' and other varieties" (citation omitted)).
69. E.g., United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993) (upholding a federal statute
banning lottery advertisements by radio stations in nonlottery states as serving the state's
substantial interest in reducing the demand for casino gambling); Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs.
v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328 (1986) (upholding a law prohibiting advertising of casino gambling
to residents of Puerto Rico as justified by the same substantial interest); Central Hudson Gas &
Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980) (articulating a four-part test
focusing, inter alia, on "whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial").
70. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996) (striking down a law
prohibiting liquor price advertising); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995) (striking
down a law prohibiting the display of alcohol content on beer labels).
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negation of regulatory penalties, but not compensatory damages. Had the
law been otherwise, such claims surely would have surfaced. Presumably,
the large drugstore chains that were barred from drug price advertising by
the regulation in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy would have made
money had such advertising been allowed. Their lost profits might have
been considerable. The same might have been true for the low-price
retailers in 44 Liquormart. If the Justices had faced the prospect of
potentially enormous damages judgments for lost profits due to government
regulation, they might have thought twice about the decisions. Again, it is
plausible to believe that requiring full compensation for past harms would
have inhibited constitutional innovation.
In these and other First Amendment areas, the effect of qualified
immunity is not to avoid overdeterrence of street-level officials, but to
liberate courts from the straitjacket of retroactivity and so to facilitate the
growth and development of constitutional law. That different rationales
apply in different contexts is exactly what we should expect. Despite the
categorical generality of qualified immunity doctrine, the defense functions
differently for different rights.
C. Non-Rights
To say that qualified immunity prevents overdeterrence and facilitates
change is not to say that the doctrine precisely tracks these rationales. On
the contrary, qualified immunity exists as a rule of fixed and invariant
content. For all rights and in all situations, it precludes damages liability for
acts that "a reasonable officer could have believed... to be lawful."72 This
doctrinal formulation does not fit all situations. In some cases where the
Court is reluctant (rightly or wrongly) to approve a federal damages
remedy, qualified immunity does not readily apply. In these cases, the
Court sometimes avoids unwanted civil liability not by limiting the
damages remedy, but by narrowing the underlying right. Restriction of
rights therefore functions as an alternative to qualified immunity. So far as
damages are concerned, the two strategies are equivalent.
Here the right-remedy dynamic is the same as that discussed in
connection with the First Amendment, but viewed from the opposite
direction. Sometimes the Court deploys qualified immunity to avoid money
damages, a move that allows and invites expansion of rights. At other times
the Court constrains rights to avoid money damages, a move that precludes
enforcement of rights by other means. A complete picture of qualified
immunity must include cases where it is invoked and cases where it is
71. 517 U.S. 484.
72. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987).
2001
The Yale Law Journal
unavailable. In the same way that the movement of one heavenly body can
confirm the gravitational pull of its unseen neighbor, decisions of "non-
rights" can reflect the effect on constitutional law of a one-size-fits-all
approach to the damages remedy.
A case in point is Paul v. Davis.73 The chief of police of Louisville,
Kentucky, distributed Edward Charles Davis's name and mug shot in a list
of "active shoplifters," even though Davis had been accused but not
convicted of that offense. Davis could have sued for defamation under state
law, but instead sought damages under § 1983, asserting that he had been
deprived of constitutionally protected "liberty" without due process of law.
Anxious to avoid making the Fourteenth Amendment a "font of tort law," 74
the Supreme Court construed the "life, liberty, or property" protected by
due process to exclude reputation. The effect of this ruling was not merely
to preclude money damages, but to pretermit any federal constitutional
scrutiny of official condemnation of identified individuals.
Although Paul has been attacked on many grounds,75 some observers
have expressed sympathy with the Court's desire not to convert every
officer error into a constitutional tort.76 As several scholars have noted, this
prospect could have been avoided by limiting the damages remedy rather
than by gutting the underlying right.77 To see the difference, one must look
to some other remedy. What if § 1983 had never been enacted (or had been
narrowly construed), and Mr. Davis had merely tried to enjoin his inclusion
on a list of "active shoplifters"? Or what if Louisville had passed an
ordinance requiring Mr. Davis to register as an "active shoplifter" because
he had once been arrested for that offense? Suppose that Davis refused to
register and raised his federal constitutional claim as a defense against
73. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
74. Id. at 701.
75. See, e.g., JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR. ET AL., CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS: ENFORCING THE
CONSTITUTION 233-35 (2000) (discussing and referencing various grounds for criticizing Paul).
76. E.g., Henry Paul Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property," 62 CORNELL L. REV. 405,
429 (1977) (describing the Court's response to the staggering array of § 1983 complaints as
"understandable, if not acceptable"); Rodney A. Smolla, The Displacement of Federal Due
Process Claims by State Tort Remedies: Parratt v. Taylor and Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.,
1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 831, 836-41 (arguing that permitting Davis's § 1983 claim would have
unnecessarily converted a state tort into a constitutional violation).
77. E.g., Melvyn R. Durchslag, Federalism and Constitutional Liberties: Varying the Remedy
To Save the Right, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 723, 742-48 (1979) (suggesting that qualified immunity
might be a more appropriate way of narrowing the scope of constitutional torts while preserving
the rights that § 1983 is meant to protect); Monaghan, supra note 76, at 429 (speculating that it
might have been better to read § 1983 "less than literally ... so as not to embrace all the
interests" protected by due process); Christina Brooks Whitman, Emphasizing the Constitutional
in Constitutional Torts, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 661, 678 (1997) (arguing that an expansion of
immunity is preferable to a contraction of rights as a way of controlling the fimancial burdens on
local governments and reducing incentives to sue). For an argument that Paul matters less than it
seems, because most of the claims excluded from procedural due process resurface under other
constitutional guarantees, see Barbara E. Armacost, Race and Reputation: The Real Legacy of
Paul v. Davis, 85 VA. L. REV. 569, 586-617 (1999).
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punishment for that omission. Would the Supreme Court then have found
that he had no right? Or would the Justices have allowed injunctive or
defensive relief despite their concern about money damages? There is, of
course, no way to be sure, but the idea that the Justices would have
approved of a law requiring registration and public condemnation of
persons merely accused of crimes seems incredible. If that is true, Paul v.
Davis is an example of the § 1983 tail wagging the constitutional dog.78 The
Court declared a non-right in order to avoid an unwelcome remedy.
This phenomenon is not unique to Paul v. Davis or even to procedural
due process. It also occurs in the construction of "substantive" rights,
especially those that protect against acts done with malicious motivation.
Qualified immunity tends not to matter where the underlying constitutional
violation requires malicious motivation.7 This is not merely to say that
violation of the underlying right requires a particular state of mind. That is
true of most rights. Procedural due process, for example, is triggered when
the government intentionally deprives a person of life, liberty, or property,
but not when such injury results from mere negligence. 0 Qualified
immunity nevertheless arises in procedural due process cases when
government officers reasonably but mistakenly believe that the process
provided was all that was due.8" Violation of other rights, however, requires
a motivation widely understood to be reprehensible. For those rights,
qualified immunity becomes functionally irrelevant.
The interaction of qualified immunity with the state-of-mind
requirements for violation of underlying rights is illustrated by the law on
racial discrimination. The Equal Protection Clause bars purposeful
discrimination.82 Someone who purposely discriminates against racial
minorities cannot claim that he or she reasonably thought such action to be
lawful. The defense is irrelevant because it is factually incredible. A person
who purposely discriminates in favor of minorities, by contrast, may well
be reasonable in thinking such action permissible. The law of affirmative
78. For another narrow construction of "liberty" in the context of a § 1983 damages action,
see Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 233-34 (1991), which held that, regardless of motivation,
defamation by a government officer is not a constitutional violation. Paul and Siegert are
examples of what Daryl Levinson calls "remedial deterrence," which occurs when "the threat of
undesirable remedial consequences motivat[es] courts to construct the right in such a way as to
avoid those consequences." Levinson, supra note 15, at 884-85.
79. This point is explained in detail in Jeffries, supra note 17, at 55-56, which describes the
mental state, if any, required for constitutional violations.
80. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986) (holding that due process is not
violated by negligent deprivations).
81. E.g., McGhee v. Draper, 564 F.2d 902, 915 (10th Cir. 1977) (affirming a directed verdict
for school officials who dismissed a teacher without adequate procedural safeguards because
earlier decisions "did not stake out the extent of the procedural rights which we now recognize").
82. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977) ("Proof
of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause.").
2000]
The Yale Law Journal
action remains notoriously unsettled, and, depending on the circumstances,
preferences for minorities may be valid. Thus, while it is not possible to say
that qualified immunity is irrelevant whenever violation of the underlying
right requires a particular state of mind, one can say that for some state-of-
mind requirements-namely, those specifying a motivation everywhere
recognized as malicious-qualified immunity will not matter.
Requiring malicious motivation to prove a constitutional violation
narrows the underlying right. A heightened culpability requirement can
therefore function as an alternative to qualified immunity as a way to curtail
potential liability. The fact that heightened culpability and expanded
immunity are, so far as damages are concerned, functionally equivalent may
lead courts to require malicious motivation in all enforcement contexts
when their real concern is money damages.
Substitution of this sort may have occurred in County of Sacramento v.
Lewis.83 In that case, a deputy sheriff signaled two boys on a motorcycle to
stop, and gave chase when they did not. Though the boys were suspected of
nothing more than failure to stop, the deputy pursued them in a squad car,
sometimes approaching to within 100 feet of the fleeing motorcycle at
speeds of 100 miles per hour. Eventually, the passenger, sixteen-year-old
Philip Lewis, fell from the motorcycle and was killed by the police car. His
parents sued the deputy, but the Supreme Court ruled that the boy's right to
life was not infringed unless the deputy acted with the actual intent to hurt
him. Mindless incompetence and reckless indifference did not suffice.
The Justices reached this decision in the context of a damages claim,
which may be the only way the issue would arise. Under City of Los
Angeles v. Lyons, 4 perhaps no one would have standing to enjoin such
actions, even if high-speed chases for any and all reasons were explicitly
authorized by code or regulation. Lewis, however, held that even a proper
plaintiff could not enjoin a chase policy unless it authorized pursuit of
suspects in order to hurt them. This exaggerated culpability requirement
precludes damages liability as effectively as would an expanded version of
qualified immunity, but with potentially greater consequences. Whether the
Court would have reacted differently had it faced this claim in another
remedial context is impossible to say, but Lewis may be another example of
the prospect of monetary damages inducing a restrictive definition of the
underlying right.
Of course, the fact that some constitutional arguments are received
less hospitably than one might wish does not necessarily say anything
about constitutional tort law or qualified immunity. When restrictive
83. 523 U.S. 833 (1998).
84. 461 U.S. 95, 105-06 (1983) (holding that a person injured by an unnecessary "choke-
hold" had standing to seek damages for his injuries but not, absent proof of likely recurrence or
that choking was properly authorized, to seek injunctive relief).
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interpretations are reached in § 1983 actions, however, the possibility exists
that rights are being restricted across the board in order to accommodate
concerns specific to money damages. Qualified immunity acknowledges
that possibility by decoupling damages from other remedies. When
qualified immunity applies, its effect is to prevent overdeterrence and to
facilitate change. When qualified immunity is not available (or the option of
exploiting it is not explored), courts may avoid money damages by
narrowing rights. If this occurs-and I think it does-then the incentive
arises from the rigidity of current doctrine in insisting that the same
formulation of qualified immunity must apply to all rights on the same
terms.
II. BEYOND REMEDIAL UNIFORMITY
That qualified immunity plays different roles for different constitutional
violations is exactly what one should expect. The strictures in the
Constitution were not conceived as predicates for money damages.85 They
were aimed in the first instance at empowering the target of a government
prosecution or enforcement proceeding to resist that action on the ground
that it violated the superior law of the Constitution. Indeed, this defensive
remedy may be the only one actually required by the Constitution.86 It
should not be surprising that constitutional prohibitions aimed chiefly at
disabling government enforcement proceedings do not always readily
convert into occasions for compensatory damages.
The potential dissonance between tort remedies and constitutional
rights is especially great in modem constitutional law, which is full of
prophylactic rules and doctrines that extend constitutional protections
beyond what principle might require. Such strategies are not limited to
overtly prophylactic pronouncements, such as the warning requirements of
Miranda v. Arizona, 7 but are a routine part of the definition of rights.8" The
85. The Takings Clause may be an exception. Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer,
New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARv. L. REv. 1731, 1779 n.244
(1991) (noting that the Takings Clause "can be read as expressly requiring a damages remedy
('just compensation') when a taking has occurred").
86. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 73-76 (1996) (holding that Congress
can withhold injunctive relief as well as damages); United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 683-84
(1987) (holding that no damages remedy need be provided for injuries inflicted by
unconstitutional acts in the military, regardless of the inadequacy of remedial alternatives). For a
scholarly exchange on the question of whether constitutional rights must function as a sword as
well as a shield, see John Harrison, Jurisdiction, Congressional Power, and Constitutional
Remedies, 86 GEO. L.J. 2513, 2516-17 (1998), which discusses a system of enforcement based on
defensive invocation of constitutional rights and officer suits based on private wrongs; and Daniel
J. Meltzer, Congress, Courts, and Constitutional Remedies, 86 GEo. L.J. 2537, 2551 (1998),
which disputes Harrison's "radical" conception and suggests a broader approach to determining
when remedies are constitutionally required.
87. 384 U.S 436 (1966).
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greater the prophylactic sweep of a particular rule or doctrine, the more
likely it is to encompass interests conceptually distant from the underlying
constitutional concern. Awarding money damages for all harms caused by
constitutional violations raises the specter of compensation for injuries that
the Constitution is not meant to prevent.8 9 An example would be the guilty
victim of a warrantless search who, if the evidence were not excluded,
could claim damages not only for the invasion of privacy but also for the
(socially desirable) injuries of criminal trial, conviction, and punishment.
To the Supreme Court, at least, this prospect seems absurd.9' For present
purposes, the point is not whether recovery of damages for constitutionally
irrelevant injuries-more precisely, for injuries unrelated to the risks that
the constitutional prohibition was designed to avoid-is on balance
desirable.9" The point here is merely to confirm that the adaptation of
constitutional thou-shalt-nots to awards of compensatory damages poses
questions unique to that remedy and that those questions depend (at least in
part) on the nature of the underlying right.
It is my contention that the liability rule for money damages should
vary with the constitutional violation at issue. The logical place to locate
this argument is the doctrine of qualified immunity, which differentiates
damages from other remedies. Qualified immunity should be used not only
to distinguish damages from other remedies, but also to differentiate
damages among rights. For some constitutional violations, damages should
be much more readily available than under current doctrine; for others, they
perhaps should be further constrained. The considerations that attend such
choices spring not only from policies generally applicable to the damages
remedy, but also from the content and context of constitutional violations.
The current law of § 1983 accommodates the former set of concerns but
ignores the latter.
88. See Levinson, supra note 15, at 903-04 (arguing that prophylactic rules are ubiquitous
because of the necessity that constitutional doctrine be "rule-like" if it is to "have any useful
meaning in governing the primary behavior of government"); David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of
Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHi. L. REv. 190, 190 (1988) ("'[P]rophylactic' rules are not
exceptional measures of questionable legitimacy but are a central and necessary feature of
constitutional law.").
89. See generally John C. Jeffries, Jr., Damages for Constitutional Violations: The Relation
of Risk to Injury in Constitutional Torts, 75 VA. L. REv. 1461 (1989) (exploring the potential
mismatch between the rationales for constitutional rights and the interests vindicated by the award
of money damages for their violation).
90. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 n.7 (1994) (holding that the compensable
injury for illegal search "does not encompass the 'injury' of being convicted and imprisoned" for
one's crimes).
91. Compare Jeffries, supra note 89, at 1461 (arguing that money damages for violations of
constitutional rights ordinarily should compensate only "constitutionally relevant injuries-that
is, injuries within the risks that the constitutional prohibition seeks to avoid"), with Nahmod,
supra note 16, at 1011-21 (disputing that view).
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To put the same point another way, we should reject the radical
dissociation of right and remedy immanent in current doctrine. One need
not go so far as to believe that there is no distinction between right and
remedy in order to recognize that they are interdependent and related.92 By
constructing constitutional tort law as an elaborate body of remedial
doctrine applicable indifferently to all rights, the Supreme Court has denied
what all sensitive observers of the field-including, of course, the Justices
themselves-know to be true: Rights cannot sensibly be crafted apart from
remedies, or vice versa. Each depends on, interacts with, and helps define
the other. The law of § 1983 should embrace that insight.
To that end, qualified immunity should lose its fixed doctrinal content.
It should be treated as a cluster of related variables, more or less like mens
rea in the criminal law. At some level of abstraction, the state-of-mind
requirement plays a consistent role in the definition of crimes, but the
precise content varies. It varies not only with the consequence of conviction
(intentional homicide is punished more severely than negligent homicide),
but also with the nature of the proscribed conduct. Sometimes the actus reus
of crime is richly indicative of fault; sometimes it is morally ambiguous.
Generally speaking, lesser culpability suffices for realized harms (homicide
and arson, for example), and higher culpability is required for inchoate or
preliminary acts (such as attempts). The mens rea for a particular offense
cannot sensibly be specified without reference to underlying conduct.
Just as mens rea is a doctrinal category presumptively applicable to all
crimes but varying among them, qualified immunity should become the
doctrinal home of rules governing money damages for constitutional
violations, and those rules should be allowed to vary among constitutional
claims. Stated most radically, there should be a separate defense of
qualified immunity-or rather the possibility of a separate defense of
qualified immunity-for each kind of constitutional violation. Just as the
generalities of the First Amendment are disaggregated into different
doctrines, the law of money damages should be also. Doctrinal categories-
such as commercial speech or content-neutral regulations of time, place,
and manner-sort the variegated landscape of free speech claims into
manageable units of analysis and adjudication. The availability of money
damages should proceed along the same lines. There is no reason to think
that this approach would splinter constitutional tort law into tiny fragments;
each constitutional violation is not unlike every other. But equally, there is
no reason to think that all versions of qualified immunity would look the
92. I am not sure that anyone believes that there is never utility in distinguishing right from
remedy, but at times Daryl Levinson comes close. See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 15, at 922
(discussing the futility of distinguishing between "the real and the remedial" in constitutional
law).
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same. What is needed is the doctrinal freedom to adjust the damages
remedy to the policies and practicalities of specific kinds of claims.
Once one turns from trying to frame a uniform damages remedy for all
constitutional violations and seeks instead to make money damages
responsive to particular kinds of claims, a crucial consideration leaps into
view. The role of money damages in remedying constitutional violations
depends on the alternatives. Different rights have different remedies. This is
true not only for those doctrines explicitly dubbed remedial,93 but also for
remedial rules and strategies incorporated into the definition of rights.94 To
design a remedial package suitable for a specific kind of constitutional
violation, one must have some sense not only of the considerations that
attend the use of particular remedies, but also of the costs and benefits of
the alternatives.
Although the relevance of alternative remedies seems obvious, it is a
consideration suppressed and ignored by constitutional tort law. This
is because alternative remedies do not exist "across the board" and
categorically, as qualified immunity is said to, but in particular
constitutional contexts. A brief return to the three areas discussed in Part I
will illustrate the kinds of concerns that should come into play.
A. Search and Seizure
As currently configured, constitutional tort law does little to redress
illegal search and seizure.9" Contributing factors include unsavory plaintiffs,
de minimis injuries,96 and perhaps defendant perjury.97 Most important is
the defense of qualified immunity. As applied to the murky and judgmental
93. The exclusionary rule is an example. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348
(1974) (describing the exclusionary rule as "a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard
Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal
constitutional ight of the party aggrieved" ).
94. See Levinson, supra note 15, at 885-87, 899-904 (discussing situations where "the
definition of a right may effectively incorporate a remedy, most commonly the equivalent of a
prophylactic, preventive injunction" and labeling this phenomenon "remedial incorporation").
95. See OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL ON THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE EXCLUSIONARY RULE 45 (1986) (reporting "fewer than
three dozen" reported Fourth Amendment cases brought under § 1983 in the previous two
decades). Successful damages actions are much more likely when illegal search and seizure leads
to ancillary harms, such as gross indignity or destruction of property. E.g., Bonitz v. Fair, 804
F.2d 164, 173 (1st Cir. 1986) (allowing recovery for body cavity searches of female inmates in the
presence of male correctional officers).
96. Again, compensable injuries are de minimis if limited to the invasion of privacy against
which the Fourth Amendment protects. Compensable injuries would be enormous if they included
arrest, trial, and punishment. See Jeffries, supra note 89, at 1474-75 (describing as "peculiar, if
not perverse" a regime that would compensate illegally searched individuals for criminal
conviction and punishment for crimes they had actually committed).
97. See Patton, supra note 39, at 763-64 (discussing the police "code of silence" as a barrier
to § 1983 recovery for excessive force).
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standards of the Fourth Amendment, qualified immunity covers a wide
range of illegal conduct that could reasonably have been thought lawful.
Just as there is no context in which the overdeterrence rationale for
qualified immunity has greater force or plausibility, there is also no context
in which the defense has greater consequence in precluding damages for
constitutional violations.
Whether this situation is acceptable or outrageous depends on the
efficacy of exclusion. Since Mapp v. Ohio,9" exclusion of evidence has been
the chief means of enforcing the Fourth Amendment. In the four decades
since that decision, contention has not waned. The remedy remains durably
controversial, as scholars debate whether the gains from denying law
enforcement officials the fruits of illegal searches justify the windfall
benefits for guilty offenders.99 The Supreme Court has responded with
grudging acceptance of the continuing need for exclusion, coupled with a
marked readiness to find exceptions. '°° The broad terms of the exclusionary
rule debate are too familiar to recount here, and in any event I have nothing
new to say. My purpose in broaching this topic is to set the stage for three
observations about the Fourth Amendment and money damages.
First, money damages and exclusion of evidence are substitutes. We
conceivably could have both, but unless we are willing to sacrifice the
Fourth Amendment completely, we could not have neither. Thus it is
indefensible, if not exactly illogical, to support restrictions on money
damages without embracing exclusion (or some other remedy). Similarly, it
will not do to bemoan the costs of exclusion unless one is willing to accept
the costs of civil liability (or vice versa). Scholars who recognize the point
have contributed to a growing literature that considers these remedies
comparatively rather than in isolation. I 1 Note, however, that this literature
98. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
99. For a representative sample of the voluminous literature, see CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD
& CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN ANALYSIS OF CASES AND CONCEPTS 45
& n.2 (2d ed. 1986), which cites studies reporting few convictions lost due to application of the
exclusionary rule; Slobogin, supra note 45, at 365 n.2, which cites sources supportive of
exclusion; and id. at 369 n.6, which cites empirical studies of the efficacy of exclusion.
100. See Slobogin, supra note 45, at 375 n.39. Slobogin summarizes the law as follows:
[I]llegally seized evidence is not excluded when it is introduced in any of the following
manners: (1) in a proceeding other than the criminal trial; (2) against someone whose
rights were not violated; (3) for impeachment purposes; (4) when the search was
conducted in good-faith reliance on a statute, warrant, or computer printout; or (5) the
evidence would inevitably have been discovered anyway or bears only an attenuated
connection to the illegality.
Id.
101. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV.
757, 811-16 (1994) (criticizing exclusion and endorsing strict liability in money damages); Randy
E. Barnett, Resolving the Dilemma of the Exclusionary Rule: An Application of Restitutive
Principles of Justice, 32 EMORY L.J. 937, 969-80 (1983) (proposing a system of restitution to
victims of unlawful searches as an alternative to exclusion of evidence); Slobogin, supra note 45
(criticizing exclusion and endorsing an enforcement regime based on money damages); William J.
Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L. REV. 881 (1991) (examining the
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is not "about" § 1983. Nor could it be. The doctrinal and intellectual
tradition of § 1983 does not invite, or even admit, comparison of money
damages with remedies applicable only to specific rights.
Second, redressing flagrant Fourth Amendment violations is not the
problem. In cases of extravagant illegality, qualified immunity plays no
role. Deterrence of officers who willfully flout Fourth Amendment rights is
entirely to the good, and punishing such behavior will not inhibit legitimate
activity. The challenging case is not the flagrant violation but the borderline
mistake, the everyday close call that might or might not be found to have
crossed a shadowy line. It is precisely such actions that qualified immunity
protects, because it is precisely such actions that strict liability would
inhibit. Yet if reasonable mistake is the situation in which qualified
immunity is most needed, it is also the situation in which exclusion is most
regretted. Few lament suppression of evidence seized by blatantly illegal
acts, and if they do, other remedies are at hand.'0 2 It is where the constable
merely "blunders" that the price may seem too high."0 3 In this context, the
choice between damages and exclusion is hard indeed. Perhaps a partial
solution would be to elaborate the warrant requirement, which, when used,
gives officers a safe harbor against award of damages but provides a check
on the after-the-fact bias that leads judges to validate borderline illegal
searches that produced incriminating evidence.'s
Third, and most instructive, there is an important category of Fourth
Amendment violations where exclusion is irrelevant. These are not simply
the unsuccessful searches, as a credible threat of exclusion would inhibit
searches ex ante, before the officers could know for sure what they would
find. The interesting category consists of searches not intended to be
successful, at least not in the sense of leading to arrest and prosecution.
There are many other reasons to search, including self-protection,
destruction of contraband, maintenance of police authority, and simple
harassment. 10 5 A threat to suppress evidence that the police do not expect to
find or intend to use is next to meaningless. For such cases, exclusion is
different functions served by the warrant requirement under damages and exclusion enforcement
regimes).
102. E.g., Slobogin, supra note 45, at 366 (endorsing exclusion "when police fragrantly
abridge Fourth Amendment rights or illegally seize private papers").
103. People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926) (Cardozo, J.) ("The criminal is to go
free because the constable has blundered.").
104. Stuntz, supra note 101, at 909-10 (noting that warrants amount to a "presumptive
defense" in subsequent damage actions); id. at 916 (discussing warrants as a cure for the "after-
the-fact" bias in suppression hearings).
105. E.g., Surell Brady, Arrests Without Prosecution and the Fourth Amendment, 59 MD. L.
REV. 1, 36-49 (2000) (assessing the prevalence and causes of arrests without prosecution); Neil A.
Milner, Supreme Court Effectiveness and the Police Organization, 36 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.




irrelevant, and reliance on it to enforce the Fourth Amendment is mere
pretense. The remedy is damages or nothing.
The lack of alternative enforcement suggests that searches not designed
to lead to arrest should be compensated more readily by money damages
than current doctrine allows. That conclusion would seem to follow from
Fourth Amendment reasoning, but some judges may have an intuition that
not all such searches are illegitimate. They may think that, so long as the
search could be justified by its relation to illegal activity, the police should
be allowed to engage in it, even if they do so for different reasons.1" In
other words, judges may believe that the felt need of law enforcement
officers to maintain their authority on the street requires judicial tolerance
of a wide range of stop-and-search activity that could be termed
harassment. 1°7 How tightly to control such activity is a difficult question for
which I have no pat answer. At the least, however, one can say that the
problem of searches not designed to uncover evidence is different from the
problem of illegal searches generally-different because of the irrelevance
of exclusion. It follows that this category of Fourth Amendment violation
would require a different enforcement strategy, one that might well include
specially favorable rules on the availability of money damages.
In my view, an overall strategy for enforcing the Fourth Amendment
would likely involve some combination of exclusion, damages, and
the occasional systemic injunction. Exclusion (with exceptions for
impeachment and so forth) would be the remedy of choice for most cases of
ordinary police error. Damages would not be necessary or suitable for most
such cases, but would be crucial in redressing illegal searches not intended
to lead to arrest and prosecution. Finally, injunctive relief, though obviously
impractical for most Fourth Amendment violations, could play a useful role
in coercing reform of institutional culture in departments that have a pattern
of pervasive unconstitutional behavior.
Obviously, these few observations do not resolve the difficulties of
enforcing the Fourth Amendment, but perhaps they suffice to suggest that a
sensible strategy would take advantage of all remedial opportunities,
deploying each where it would be most useful. Nothing in the law of
exclusion prevents this sort of tailoring. Indeed, the current regime of
exclusion with exceptions illustrates the Court's attempt to follow precisely
this approach. Similarly, injunctions are essentially ad hoc and may be
issued or withheld as circumstances permit. The law of § 1983, however,
106. See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (upholding the stop of a vehicle
as justified by probable cause to believe that a traffic offense had been committed,
notwithstanding the officer's subjective intention to uncover drug trafficking).
107. See, e.g., Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 106-07 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(emphasizing the need to rely on the discretion of police officers to determine whether groups of
loiterers include persons who threaten the public peace).
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asserts that money damages are governed by strict remedial uniformity, not
only among the situations comprehended by the Fourth Amendment but
across all constitutional rights. This is the mistake. No doctrine that makes
money damages available (or unavailable) on the same terms for all rights
can hope to accommodate the range of considerations that should come into
play.
B. Freedom of Speech
Just as the exclusionary rule dominates the landscape of the Fourth
Amendment, facial review looms over the First. The overbreadth doctrine
allows those whose speech could validly be proscribed to challenge an
overbroad law on the ground that it would be unconstitutional as applied to
others.'0 8 In this way, one claimant stands for all. Much the same effect is
achieved by the rule against prior restraints. What is especially noxious
about prior restraint is not that it is prior-the threat of punishment always
precedes, as the fact of punishment always follows, the act in question-but
rather that preclearance requirements invite overbreadth in application.'0 9
The rule disfavoring prior restraints targets laws likely to prove overbroad
in administration, even if the particular application is unobjectionable."'
Facial review is also implicit in the rule that a content-neutral regulation of
the time, place, and manner of speech will be struck down if it gives
executive officers uncontrolled discretion."' Discretion carries the risk that
the law will be administered nonneutrally. Striking down such laws is
overbreadth in a time frame: Rather than wait for evidence of bias in
enforcement, the courts invalidate laws that have that potential, even if the
experience to date is unobjectionable.
In all versions, facial review operates to reduce the number of claimants
needed to enforce First Amendment rights. That is its purpose and effect.
108. Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REv. 844, 845 (1970)
(noting that statutes may be reviewed for overbreadth "without regard to the constitutional status
of a particular claimant's conduct").
109. E.g., John C. Jeffries, Jr., Rethinking Prior Restraint, 92 YALE L.J. 409, 422 (1983)
(discussing how "[t]he administrative apparatus erected to effect preclearance may screen a range
of expression far broader than that which otherwise would be brought to official attention"); see
also Vincent Blasi, Toward a Theory of Prior Restraint: The Central Linkage, 66 MLNN. L. REv.
11, 22-23 (1981) (detailing disadvantages of licensing systems, including that "the initial decision
to disallow speech is made by an administrative officer who specializes in suppression").
110. Jeffries, supra note 109, at 425 ("A rule of special hostility to administrative
preclearance is just another way of saying that determinations under the overbreadth doctrine
should take account not only of the substance of the law but also of the structure of its
administration." ).
111. See, e.g., City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Pub'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 772 (1988) (citing
the mayor's uncontrolled discretion as a reason for invalidating an ordinance requiring permits for
placement of newspaper vending machines on public property); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558,
560 (1948) (invalidating an ordinance against sound amplification devices because it gave the
chief of police unguided discretion to permit or forbid them).
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Reliance on remedial opportunities (such as actions for money damages) to
encourage enforcement is therefore diminished. If one claimant wins for all,
others need not apply. It follows that constitutional tort actions are
relatively unimportant in vindicating First Amendment rights-at least for
the kinds of claims encompassed by facial review. For most free speech
claims, § 1983 can safely be relegated to backup status, providing a
(probably redundant) remedy if the government continues to invoke laws
found facially unconstitutional. Qualified immunity would not matter, as no
officer could reasonably believe in the legality of enforcing laws adjudged
invalid across the board.
For most of the First Amendment landscape, therefore, current doctrine
works well. Qualified immunity precludes money damages when belief in
the legality of regulation is reasonable. The curtailment of retrospective
relief lessens the cost of innovation and facilitates expansion of rights. The
resulting tendency toward underenforcement of existing rights is offset by
facial review. While the opportunities to vindicate free speech claims are
reduced, each successful claim counts for more. The good sense in this
arrangement cannot be seen by looking at damages alone; it becomes
apparent only when the field of vision expands to include other strategies
for enforcing the First Amendment.
That leaves retaliation. Claims of retaliation for the exercise of First
Amendment freedoms do not benefit from facial review. The laws involved
in such cases do not purport to regulate speech; they deal with public
employment, prison discipline, or other workaday business of government.
Retaliation plaintiffs allege that facially innocuous laws have been misused
to punish free expression. Obviously, a successful claim of this sort does
not vindicate the rights of others. Each abuse requires its own redress.
If the courts are to safeguard protected speech against illegal retaliation,
they must find a way to encourage such claims and to hear them case by
case. For this role, damages actions are ideal. They encourage retaliation
victims to vindicate their rights, they provide an appropriate disincentive
for government officers tempted to misuse their powers, and they run scant
risk of inhibiting legitimate activity. The problem, if there is one, is that the
ordinary rules of civil litigation invite harassment by ideological plaintiffs
and by those, such as prisoners, for whom litigation can be fun. One has
only to imagine the range of discovery arguably relevant to an allegation of
improper motive to see the risk involved. This concern prompted the
Supreme Court to eliminate the "subjective" branch of qualified immunity
in order to foreclose meritless cases before trial.' 12 In effect, the Court
112. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817-18 (1982) (precluding discovery and trial,
notwithstanding allegations of malice, where the officer's misconduct "does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known").
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adopted a special rule of summary judgment to take account of the peculiar
litigation incentives in constitutional tort cases.
When confronted with the question of whether something similar
should be done for illicitly motivated constitutional violations, however, the
Court balked. Crawford-El v. Britton 13 involved a litigious and outspoken
life-term prisoner who was transferred from one facility to another due to
overcrowding. He claimed that boxes of belongings were given to his
brother-in-law, a corrections employee, rather than shipped directly to the
new institution, in order to punish him for inflammatory interviews and
previous lawsuits. As the Chief Justice remarked in dissent, the act of
delivering boxes "would seem to be about as far from a violation of
the First Amendment as can be conceived," but the "claim of illicit
motive... transforms a routine act in the course of prison administration
into a constitutional tort." 114 Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that the
defendant in an illicit-motive constitutional tort claim should be entitled to
summary judgment if "he can offer a lawful reason for his action and the
plaintiff cannot establish, through objective evidence, that the offered
reason is actually a pretext." 15 Justice Scalia, also in dissent, endorsed a
more draconian rule that would have barred recovery whenever "the
asserted grounds for the official action were objectively valid," regardless
of evidence of improper motive." 6 The majority shared the dissenters'
concerns but refused to go so far in limiting retaliation plaintiffs. Instead,
the majority suggested that trial judges make more vigorous use of existing
procedures to weed out unfounded claims."' i
It seems to me that the Crawford-El majority was right to temporize,
notwithstanding the realistic risk that government officials will be subjected
to harassment by litigation. The decisive reason is the lack of alternative
remedies. Protecting the First Amendment rights of prisoners, government
employees, and others subject to bureaucratic control requires that
retaliation plaintiffs be allowed to prove their claims. Otherwise, there is no
constraint. Here, as in few other First Amendment contexts, constitutional
tort actions really matter."'s
113. 523 U.S. 574(1998).
114. Id. at 607 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 605.
116. Id. at 612 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 597-601 (detailing procedures available to federal trial judges).
118. After completing this Essay, I had the pleasure of reading an excellent article analyzing
First Amendment retaliation claims by public employees in terms broadly consistent with the
approach suggested here. See Michael Wells, Section 1983, the First Amendment, and Public





When one considers decisions such as Paul v. Davis"' and County of
Sacramento v. Lewis,'20 the suspicion arises that the Court may have
resorted to a crabbed and contemptuous construction of a constitutional
right merely to avoid federalizing litigation over damages. In response,
some have suggested that these decisions should have been based on an
expansive construction of qualified immunity rather than on a restrictive
definition of the underlying right.' Following that suggestion would yield
important advantages. Using qualified immunity to curtail civil liability
decouples damages from injunctions and other remedies. It leaves open the
possibility that a claim the courts are unwilling to redress by money
damages might be vindicated through other means. Limiting liability by
constricting rights, by contrast, means that injunctions, defenses, and other
remedies are also precluded.
Whether a broad or narrow ground of decision is preferable depends on
the claim involved. Sometimes a categorical bar to all federal intervention
is exactly right; other times, it may not be. One disturbing thing about Paul
and Lewis is the suspicion that the Justices may have foreclosed all forms of
relief while focusing only on money damages. The opinions give no
evidence that they considered any other context. The risk is not only that
the Justices may err in construing the Constitution (which is just another
way of saying that the rest of us remain free to think so), but that they may
reach a decision without having fully considered the consequences.
The magnitude of this risk depends importantly on one's attitude
toward injunctions. Especially controversial is the systemic or structural
reform injunction, in which courts undertake to supervise the performance
of departments or agencies that persistently violate the Constitution. For
those who categorically oppose such intervention, there is no point in
preserving the possibility of injunctive relief. For those who think that such
injunctions are sometimes warranted, however, the decoupling of damages
is potentially very valuable, as it preserves the possibility of other remedies
in an appropriate case.
Personally, I think that the value of structural reform injunctions is
often underestimated, especially in law enforcement. There are many kinds
of unconstitutional police behavior that are unlikely to be redressed even by
a well-functioning regime of money damages. Police brutality cases are an
example. As anyone who follows the newspapers knows, juries typically
119. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
120. 523 U.S. 833 (1998).
121. Supra note 77 and accompanying text.
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side with the cops.1'2 Their reason for doing so is not moral depravity or
even virulent racism (though no doubt racial fears and prejudices corrupt
clear thinking), but an essentially understandable sympathy for the police.
In the words of Scott Turow,
Jurors are loath to convict because they know that cops on the job
are trying to protect not only themselves but, more importantly, us.
The jurors. Their families. Yes, some cops are bullies; some want
the job so they can handle a gun. But most are decent, well-
intentioned folks who have taken up a calling that is not
particularly well-paid and in which, for our benefit, they face risks
every day far greater than those most of us confront when we leave
for the office.'
Against the backdrop of these assumptions, the occasional case of
gratuitous brutality is hard to spot. Almost always (videotapes aside), there
is uncertainty about the facts and conflicting testimony from police officers
and their accusers. With the best of intentions and the purest of minds,
jurors may have no way of finding the occasional bad apple in a barrel they
believe to be generally good. In such a situation, the advantage of a
structural reform injunction is that it allows an aggregate, as opposed
to individualized, approach to evidence of misconduct. Even if no
specific instance can confidently be pronounced unconstitutional, an
epidemiological approach to excessive force might identify departments
that are institutionally slack or culturally corrupt or politically out of
control.
My own view is that structural reform injunctions can be used-and
sometimes have been used-very effectively to address the problem of
defective institutions, but that is another essay. For the present, I rest on the
minimal proposition that the possibility of structural reform as a meaningful
way of enforcing the Constitution should not be precluded prematurely by
decisions aimed at money damages. Decoupling damages from injunctions
at least ensures that remedial difficulties applicable only in one context do
not automatically infect others.
III. CONCLUSION
This Essay has attempted to clarify and reconceptualize constitutional
tort law. Current doctrine severs remedies from rights and authorizes
122. E.g., Scott Turow, Presumed Guilty: You Think You Know Why the Diallo Cops Were
Acquitted. Think Again, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 2000, at BI ("In my eight years as an assistant U.S.
attorney, police beating cases-prosecutions for a cop's use of excessive force-were the only




money damages on terms that apply indifferently to all constitutional
violations. This remedial uniformity is faithful to the Monroe model of
statutory interpretation, but at odds with the differences among rights in
enforcement strategies and opportunities. In fact, even under current
doctrine, various constitutional claims do have-and under any plausible
understanding, should have-remedial variation. Restructuring the law of
§ 1983 to accommodate this insight would invite recognition of the
differences among rights and promote clear thinking about remedies to
enforce them.
Disaggregating constitutional torts would reorient our thinking in three
important ways. First, it would inhibit the tendency, evident in virtually all
discussions of § 1983, to cite one kind of constitutional violation as if it
stood for all.124 Reasoning based on one type of unconstitutionality will
apply across the board only if the particular represents the general. In
constitutional tort law, that is rarely true. Virtually any assertion about the
role of qualified immunity, or the availability of alternative remedies, or the
utility of damage actions in enforcing constitutional rights, will make no
sense in some contexts. That does not mean that we should abandon
theoretical and systematic analysis of constitutional tort remedies, but it
does suggest a need for caution in generating comprehensive doctrine from
specific examples.
Second, disaggregation of constitutional tort law would encourage
remedial comparison. The crucial question in enforcing the Fourth
Amendment is not whether the exclusionary rule works well or poorly. The
question is-or at least should be-whether it works better than the
available alternatives. The same is true of money damages. The costs and
benefits of damages liability as a means of enforcing the Fourth
Amendment cannot be assessed in isolation. The efficacy of exclusion is
also relevant. Such comparisons are local, not global. The fact that
exclusion of evidence provides meaningful redress for illegal search and
seizure in some contexts does not mean that it applies to all, much less that
it has relevance for other constitutional rights. Just as remedial
opportunities vary among rights, the comparative advantage of remedial
mechanisms will vary as well. The straitjacket of remedial uniformity
imposed by the current law of § 1983 hinders comparative evaluation of
alternative strategies. A more flexible approach to remedial choice would
invite attention to that concern.
Finally, I hope that thinking of remedies in relation to specific rights
would lead to better enforcement of the Constitution. If the costs and
benefits of civil liability vary across rights, remedial uniformity precludes
124. See, e.g., Jeffries, supra note 17, at 73-74 (defending a general rationale for qualified
immunity by reference to the specific example of illegal search and seizure).
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optimal enforcement. Crafting remedial strategies to redress particular
kinds of constitutional violations would hold out the prospect, at least, of
securing greater compliance at lower cost. Muddled thinking about the
relationship between rights and remedies in constitutional law not only
leads to intellectual confusion and misplaced argument; it also contributes
to shortfall and sloppiness in redressing constitutional violations. A better
understanding of the differential role of civil liability in enforcing various
rights would not make the hard choices go away, but it would remove the
conceptual blinders that prevent us from seeing those choices clearly.
Disaggregating constitutional torts would be a step in the right direction.
